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A VOICE FOR ONE, OR A VOICE
FOR THE PEOPLE: BALANCING
PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH PROTECTIONS
WITH COMMUNITY TRUST
Immanuel Kim*
Prosecutors, as representatives of the public in the criminal justice system,
are the sole advocates for “the People” in a criminal case. Thus, prosecutors
are expected to maintain a particular level of integrity that would ensure a
fair and just representation of the People. Despite this expectation, the wide
discretionary authority prosecutors hold makes it virtually impossible to
regulate their conduct. Furthermore, the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution protects many expressions of viewpoints, and such protections
extend—albeit to a limited degree—to prosecutors, thereby giving them even
more discretion in how they decide to handle their own cases. Nonetheless,
the U.S. Supreme Court has not interpreted the First Amendment to protect
prosecutors whose words evidently contravene the functions of the
prosecutor’s office. Rather, a prosecutor may be terminated if the office finds
that the prosecutor’s speech undermines the office’s interests. What the law
does not address, however, is the extent to which the First Amendment
protects prosecutors whose unfavorable viewpoints do not affect their
individual performance within the workplace but nonetheless detract from
the community’s trust in the prosecutor’s office. This Note examines the state
of the First Amendment as it applies to prosecutors within the scope of their
employment and utilizes the underlying principles to expand the discussion
to prosecutorial speech beyond the scope of their employment. Ultimately,
this Note proposes that prosecutorial speech should be regulated not only by
the effect the speech has on the office’s functions but also by the adverse
effect the speech has on the community’s trust in the prosecutor and the office
to pursue justice in an unbiased manner.

* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2015, New York
University. I would like to thank Professor Bruce A. Green for his incredible support and
guidance as well as Brianna Gallo and the other members of the Fordham Law Review who
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INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors are public officials who represent the residents of a community
(“the People”) and their interests in the criminal justice system.1 Thus,
prosecutors are responsible for garnering and maintaining the community’s
trust in the system. However, this trust may be undermined when the
community suspects that prosecutors who hold different ethical views from
the community cannot separate their biases from their duties and, therefore,
cannot zealously advocate on behalf of the people of the community.2 In
2014, residents of Orange County, Florida, faced such a conflict when
Assistant State Attorney (ASA) Kenneth Lewis, who had a very active online
1. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015).
2. See id. § 3-1.6.
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presence, posted inflammatory statements on his social media pages.3 Upon
discovering such posts, State Attorney Jeff Ashton warned ASA Lewis of his
use of social media, temporarily reassigned him, and ultimately implemented
a social media policy in 2015 to limit such discriminatory online posts by the
office’s prosecutors.4 Despite the office’s implementation of the social
media policy, on June 12, 2016—just hours after the shooting at Pulse, a gay
nightclub in Orlando—ASA Lewis posted a rant on Twitter in which he
stated that “Orlando is a national embarrassment” teeming with “3rd world
miscreants and ghetto thugs.”5 ASA Lewis was ultimately suspended and
fired from his position as a prosecutor on the ground that his online posts
violated the office’s social media policy.6 However, ASA Lewis argued that
such a policy violated his First Amendment rights because his comments
were “non-work related” and were posted through his personal account
outside of his employment hours.7 State Attorney Ashton admitted that ASA
Lewis, despite his remarks, did not demonstrate any incompetence in his
ability to exercise discretion fairly in his cases and therefore did not terminate
3. See, e.g., Gail Paschall-Brown, Prosecutor Ken Lewis Who Made ‘Crack Hoes’
Comment Reassigned Temporarily, WESH 2 NEWS (May 30, 2014, 5:59 AM),
http://www.wesh.com/article/prosecutor-ken-lewis-who-made-crack-hoes-commentreassigned-temporarily/4434103 [http://perma.cc/53U6-LG5C] (“Happy Mother’s Day to all
the crack hoes out there. It’s never too late to turn it around.” (quoting ASA Lewis’s posts on
his personal Facebook page)).
4. See David Caplan, Florida Assistant State Attorney Suspended for Controversial
Facebook Post Following Orlando Attack, ABC NEWS (June 18, 2016, 5:20 AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/florida-assistant-state-attorney-suspended-controversialfacebook-post/story?id=39954404 [http://perma.cc/X89D-7XNV]; Summer Knowles,
Prosecutor Fired over Facebook Post Sounds Off on Twitter, WESH 2 NEWS (June 24, 2016,
7:34 AM), http://www.wesh.com/article/prosecutor-fired-over-facebook-post-sounds-off-ontwitter/4450412 [http://perma.cc/P85R-L3UP]. State Attorney Ashton implemented a social
media policy instead of firing ASA Lewis for such speech because Ashton felt that Lewis’s
posts were covered under the First Amendment. See Evan Bleier, Florida Prosecutor
Apologizes for ‘Crack Hoes’ Facebook Post on Mother’s Day: Assistant State Attorney
Kenneth Lewis Admitted That He Used a “Poor Choice of Words,” UPI (May 23, 2014, 11:13
AM), http://www.upi.com/Odd_News/2014/05/23/Florida-prosecutor-apologizes-for-crackhoes-Facbeook-post-on-Mothers-Day/4131400855269/
[http://perma.cc/MC63-55Y6]
(noting that State Attorney Jeff Ashton said he would not punish ASA Lewis for what was
“clearly political speech”); Jeff Weiner, Prosecutor Says ‘Crack Hoes’ Facebook Post Was a
‘Poor Choice of Words,’ ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 22, 2014), http://articles.
orlandosentinel.com/2014-05-22/news/os-prosecutor-controversial-comments-20140522_1
_facebook-post-poor-choice-state-attorney-jeff-ashton [http://perma.cc/J6R4-N6QT].
5. Tobias Salinger, Florida Prosecutor Fired over Facebook Post Following Pulse
Massacre Calling Downtown Orlando “A Melting Pot of 3rd World Miscreants and Ghetto
Thugs,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 23, 2016, 6:41 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/prosecutor-fired-facebook-post-orlando-massacre-article-1.2685858
[http://perma.cc/XM6U-D64B]; see also Kenneth Lewis (@Prosecutorslife), TWITTER (June
12, 2016, 9:06 AM), https://twitter.com/Prosecutorslife/status/741980054515769348
[http://perma.cc/PP34-UJEC] (“Orlando is a complete cesspool. It is a melting pot of the 3rd
world and ghetto thugs.”).
6. Kenneth Lewis had posted other inflammatory remarks on his Twitter feed. See, e.g.,
Kenneth Lewis (@Prosecutorslife), TWITTER (June 9, 2016, 7:10 AM)
https://twitter.com/Prosecutorslife/status/740908820084359168
[http://perma.cc/V8RPXNY5] (“Has anyone who has been to Disney actually been to downtown Orlando? It’s a
giant toilet.”).
7. Salinger, supra note 5.
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him.8 However, Ashton eventually terminated Lewis a year later on the
ground that Lewis undermined the community’s trust in the criminal justice
system.9 Thus, this situation presents a conflict between a prosecutor’s First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and the community’s trust that the
People’s interests will be adequately represented in the criminal justice
system.
This Note seeks to address this conflict by analyzing two specific
questions. First, how far should the First Amendment’s protection extend
when a prosecutor’s private speech undermines the community’s trust in the
criminal justice system?10 Second, can a prosecutor be terminated for
engaging in speech that suggests the prosecutor’s personal viewpoints are
drastically opposed to the interests of the community? Part I of this Note
gives an overview of the prosecutor’s unique role in society as well as the
public’s perception and expectation of prosecutors as the People’s sole
representatives in the criminal justice system. This Part then discusses the
heightened standards of professional responsibility prosecutors hold by
examining the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
Function.
Part II addresses two ethical concepts that underlie prosecutors’
professional responsibility—prosecutorial discretion and conflicts of interest.
An understanding of these two ethical concepts helps to structure the
discussion of whether and, if so, to what extent prosecutorial speech should
be protected. Part III identifies the legal concerns that the U.S. Supreme
Court addresses in evaluating the extent to which prosecutors may exercise
their freedom of speech. This Part then discusses employment practices that
several circuits have adopted in dealing with prosecutorial speech. These
discussions serve to lay out the legal landscape that frames the ultimate
resolution of this Note by identifying constitutional limits to the stringent
standards imposed on prosecutors.
Part IV finally consolidates the legal and ethical concerns surrounding
problematic prosecutorial speech and reemphasizes the importance of
community trust in the criminal justice system. Ultimately, this Note extends
the current laws governing the employment of prosecutors by refining the
definition of prosecutors’ employment and characterizing the People as the
prosecutors’ employer. With this characterization, this Note proposes that
the People should be able to terminate prosecutors who express biases that
8. See Weiner, supra note 4 (“I’ve never had a victim come to us and say this man is not
treating us with respect.”).
9. Elisha Fieldstadt, Suspended Florida Official Kenneth Lewis Fired over Anti-Orlando
Facebook Post, NBC NEWS (June 25, 2016, 12:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
orlando-nightclub-massacre/suspended-florida-official-kenneth-lewis-fired-over-antiorlando-facebook-n598806 [https://perma.cc/729F-LMZM] (stating that Ashton decided to
terminate Lewis because “public trust in the criminal justice system can only be maintained
when those empowered to execute the law are, and are perceived to be, free of bias in the
execution of their duties”).
10. See Knowles, supra note 4 (“When you have people believing prosecutors aren’t
trying to defend everyone, it undermines faith in the justice system . . . .”).
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undermine the community’s trust in their ability to carry out their duties
effectively.
I. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF PROSECUTORS IN SOCIETY
As the only people who can bring a criminal charge against a suspected
criminal, prosecutors occupy a unique niche in the legal system and society.
Part I.A first highlights the important role that prosecutors play in society. In
doing so, Part I.A establishes why a prosecutor must maintain the
community’s trust in the criminal justice system to function effectively. Part
I.B then examines the ABA standards and rules that exist specifically to
govern and regulate the professional responsibilities of prosecutors.
A. The Prosecutor as an Officer of the Court
and Representative of the Criminal Justice System
Prosecutors are unique in that they are the sole representatives of the
community in a criminal trial. Unlike in civil cases, where any litigant may
easily choose and replace his or her counsel, in criminal cases, the community
has only one option for representation: the prosecutor.11 Furthermore, unlike
civil or criminal defendants who can bring an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim against their counsel when they feel that they were
inadequately represented, the community does not have the ability to sue a
prosecutor for inadequate representation that leads to a defendant’s
acquittal.12 If a prosecutor fails to fulfill his or her role adequately in
prosecuting a criminal defendant, the community has no recourse. Thus,
prosecutors make up a body of plaintiffs’ lawyers who take on the role of
being not only an officer of the court but also an irreplaceable representative
within the criminal justice system.13
Due to their role, prosecutors are expected to abide by more stringent
standards of professional responsibility. In discussing the professional
responsibility of prosecutors, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution Function expressly state that a prosecutor’s main goal is to seek
justice and, in doing so, to “act with integrity and balanced judgment . . . by
exercising discretion” appropriately.14 These standards exist to ensure that a
prosecutor acts under a higher standard of professional responsibility than
other lawyers to promote justice.15 If a prosecutor demonstrates that he or
she lacks the ability to act with integrity and balanced judgment, it is
11. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015).
12. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents individuals from being
tried twice for the same crime. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
13. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a)–(f).
14. Id. § 3-1.2(b).
15. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“The
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate . . . .”). The ABA
standards are nonbinding, so a prosecutor who does not live up to these standards would not
necessarily face sanctions, termination, or disbarment solely under these standards. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b).
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questionable whether that individual is professionally fit to serve the public
as a prosecutor.16
Despite prosecutors’ heightened standards of professional responsibility,
people have proven to be unsatisfied in terms of their trust in the criminal
justice system.17 Annual surveys conducted from 1993 to 2017 consistently
reveal that the public has very low confidence in the criminal justice
system.18 The public’s negative perception of the court in the criminal justice
system is rooted in concerns of inequitable treatment.19 In fact, the public
views the criminal justice system as favoring suspects or offenders rather
than victims.20 Therefore, any indication that prosecutors are biased21 or take
any actions that contravene the public interest will make it more difficult for
the prosecutors’ office to demonstrate that it meets the heightened standards
of professional responsibility.22
B. The ABA’s Professional Standards for Prosecutors
The ABA has published several rules, both in its Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and its Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
Function, to regulate prosecutorial actions and guide prosecutors to meet
heightened standards of professional responsibility.23 For instance, Rule 3.8
of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct regulates prosecutorial
conduct both at the start of a potential criminal prosecution by requiring the
16. See Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the Second Annual Conference
of United States Attorneys: The Federal Prosecutor (Apr. 1, 1940) (“[Prosecutors] are thus
required to win an expression of confidence in [their] character by both the legislative and the
executive branches of the government before assuming the responsibilities of a . . .
prosecutor.”).
17. See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 CRIME & JUST.
99, 131 (1992) (“There is also a perception—held by a significant number of Americans—that
one of the causes of crime is the criminal justice system itself.”).
18. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/%20
Confidence-Institutions.aspx [http://perma.cc/TBB3-8XU2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017)
(showing that less than one-third of the surveyed population in recent years has a great deal of
confidence in the criminal justice system); see also Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 951 (2006) (“Perhaps because
of these factors, nearly three-quarters of Americans lack much confidence and trust in the
criminal justice system.”); Roberts, supra note 17, at 139 (noting that surveys reveal judges
and prosecutors to be among the least credible actors within the criminal justice system).
19. Roberts, supra note 17, at 140 (“Negative attitudes toward the courts focus on . . .
perceptions that certain groups are treated inequitably . . . .”).
20. Id.
21. This bias also comes into play in the public perception of sentencing. See id. at 142
(explaining the need for a scale of severity in punishments to correlate with public perception
of the severity of the crime itself).
22. See generally id.
23. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2015) (noting that the standards, along with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, serve to provide guidance as to what the best practices would be for prosecutors).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, much like the Model Penal Code, are general
standards that have been adopted either entirely or in large part by states in writing their own
set of rules for professional responsibility. These rules are not statutes and do not have the
force of law, but they are used as guidelines in disciplinary proceedings to regulate the actions
of lawyers.
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prosecutor to find probable cause before prosecuting a charge24 and at the
end of the criminal prosecution by requiring a prosecutor to remedy a
wrongful conviction.25 These rules serve to keep prosecutors in check by
making sure that they do not prosecute individuals for an improper purpose.26
Included within the scope of improper purposes are personal biases, both
implicit and explicit, that may be manifested by a prosecutor’s words or
conduct.27
These rules mainly address situations in which the prosecutor is
subjectively biased against the criminal defendant and thereby prosecutes
that individual with an improper motive. However, the rules fail to address
situations in which a prosecutor’s bias sways his or her discretion in favor of
the criminal defendant, thereby contravening the public’s interest.28 In other
words, if a prosecutor demonstrates that he or she is fine with—or even
supportive of—actions that the community deems repugnant, how can the
People trust that prosecutor, or any other prosecutor in the same office, to
prosecute readily those crimes the community seeks to punish? The ABA’s
rules and standards do nothing to promote the community’s trust in the
criminal justice system when a prosecutor holds a view that contravenes
public interest. This is problematic because, due to the prosecutor’s
irreplaceable role, the People—and the victim—are left with no legal
recourse in the criminal justice system when a prosecutor does not zealously
prosecute a particular case. Thus, it is imperative that the system has a means
of ensuring and protecting the “people’s right to counsel,” which entails that
prosecutors will zealously prosecute crimes that the community seeks to
punish.
II. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN EXTENDING OR LIMITING
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH
Notwithstanding the rules and standards that govern prosecutors, no
regulation expressly limits prosecutorial speech beyond the scope of a

24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
25. Id. r. 3.8(h). These principles are also reflected in the heightened duty of candor for
prosecutors as opposed to other lawyers. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION § 3-1.4.
26. See Jackson, supra note 16 (“While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most
beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of
the worst.”). The principles underlying these rules are also apparent in civil claims of
malicious prosecution against a prosecutor who brought charges against a criminal defendant
for an improper motive. See, e.g., Sorrell v. County of Nassau, 162 F. Supp. 3d 156, 170
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (defining malicious prosecution as bringing criminal charges with “a wrong
or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served” (quoting
Khan v. Ryan, 145 F. Supp. 2d 280, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2001))); Bianchi v. McQueen, 58 N.E.3d
680, 699 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“‘Malice’ in the context of malicious prosecution is defined as
the actuation of a prosecution for an improper motive.”).
27. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.6.
28. See Jackson, supra note 16 (“If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows
that he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor:
that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be
prosecuted.”).
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prosecutor’s employment.29 The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, as well as the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
Function, establish two ethical values that help to inform the discussion of
such prosecutorial speech—prosecutorial discretion30 and conflict of
interest.31 Because the public inevitably relies heavily on the prosecutorial
system to bring charges against criminal defendants, it is imperative that the
public is assured that its prosecutors will not allow personal biases to
improperly sway their discretion. In the event of a bias that is bound to result
in an improper influence on the prosecutor, the public would expect the
prosecutor to recuse himself or herself from the case for having a conflict of
interest.32 However, because it is impractical for even the most biased
prosecutor to recuse himself or herself from every single case, the public
needs some degree of confidence in their prosecutors’ viewpoints or in their
ability to separate their viewpoints from their duties.
Part II.A discusses how the wide scope of prosecutorial discretion,
although a core value for the criminal justice system, raises concerns about a
prosecutor’s personal biases. This Part also highlights how prosecutorial
discretion is virtually undetectable and highly unregulated by the courts,
thereby providing little substantive guidance for prosecutorial speech. Part
II.B points out that there are more substantive regulations when a prosecutor
has a conflict of interest. However, this Part further explains that, while the
underlying principles are useful in addressing the issue that this Note
addresses, the substantive regulations themselves do little to address
prosecutorial speech that demonstrates a problematic viewpoint.
A. The Largely Unregulated Nature of Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors exercise wide discretion in almost every aspect of the criminal
justice system, from bail hearings and granting immunity to charging and
sentencing.33 One important area in which prosecutors exercise wide,
unreviewable34 discretion is in filing criminal charges—a duty, and authority,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra Part III.B.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 3-4.2, 3-4.4.
Id. § 3-1.7.
See, e.g., id. § 3-1.7(a).
See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 741 (1996). See generally Jackson, supra note 16.
34. Misner, supra note 33, at 743 (“The prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute a case is
virtually unreviewable.”); see also United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 122 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he decision . . . whether to prosecute generally rests within broad discretion of the
prosecutor, and a prosecutor’s pretrial charging decision is presumed legitimate.” (first
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 2000)));
Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“‘[W]hether to prosecute and
what charge to file or bring before federal grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the
prosecutor’s discretion,’ and even when individuals are wronged in a manner cognizable under
criminal law, they ‘do not have a constitutional right to the prosecution of alleged criminals.’”
(quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); then quoting Capogrosso v.
Supreme Court, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam))); United States v. Cameron,
658 F. Supp. 2d 241, 244 (D. Me. 2009) (“[The government’s] broad discretion [as to whom
to prosecute] is based largely on the recognition that ‘the decision to prosecute is particularly
ill-suited to judicial review.’” (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)));
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that make the prosecutor one of the most influential players in the criminal
justice system.35 As characterized by Attorney General Robert H. Jackson,
however, this tremendous discretion is dangerous because it gives the
prosecutor “more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other
person in America.”36 Unfortunately, it is impossible to know—and
therefore impossible to monitor—what considerations a prosecutor makes
when exercising his or her discretion,37 but that is why lawyers, and thus
prosecutors, are expected to have a requisite standing of good character
before being admitted to their state’s bar.38
Even if it seems unfavorable to grant prosecutors such wide discretion,
prosecutorial discretion must be preserved, first and foremost, because it is
practically unfeasible for any prosecutor to investigate every crime.39 The
centralization of discretion to the prosecutor’s office is the result of historical
development, and, as of now, granting this discretion to prosecutors is the
most efficient method of maintaining a functional criminal justice system.40

United States v. Tobin, 598 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (D. Me. 2009) (“To be sure, courts must
tread lightly when assessing prosecutorial charging decisions. ‘Whether to prosecute and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s
discretion.’ These decisions are necessarily informed by sensitive judgments about
dangerousness, deterrence, and enforcement priorities, which courts ought not readily secondguess.” (citation omitted) (quoting Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124).
35. See Misner, supra note 33, at 743 (“In the area of charging, prosecutorial decisions—
such as whether to prosecute, how to prosecute, how long to sentence, and whether to dismiss
charges—all contribute to the creation of the prosecutor as the real policy-maker within the
criminal justice system.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (“There
is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country’s legal system vests in prosecuting
attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse.”).
36. Jackson, supra note 16.
37. Richard M. Re, Imagining Perfect Surveillance, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 264,
286 (2016) (“Further, it was generally difficult or even impossible for any other institutional
actor to monitor executive enforcement decisions, if only because there were so many
discretionary choices that most would inevitably evade review.”).
38. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“Before
recommending an applicant for admission, a lawyer should satisfy himself that the applicant
is of good moral character.”); Comment, Procedural Due Process and Character Hearings
for Bar Applicants, 15 STAN. L. REV. 500, 500 (1963) (“Every state in the United States, as a
prerequisite for admission to the practice of law, requires that applicants possess ‘good moral
character.’” (quoting RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN THE UNITED STATES AND
TERRITORIES (36th ed. 1959))); Jackson, supra note 16 (“[T]he post of Federal District
Attorney from the very beginning has been safeguarded by presidential appointment,
requiring . . . an expression of confidence in . . . character . . . before assuming the
responsibilities of a federal prosecutor.”). See generally NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N,
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-2.1 (3d ed. 2009) (emphasizing that prosecutors are
to exercise good faith and integrity in their professional capacity and place the interests of
society at large before anything else); infra Part III.C.1 (discussing Hale v. Committee on
Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2003)).
39. Jackson, supra note 16 (“There is a most important reason why the prosecutor should
have, as nearly as possible, a detached and impartial view of all groups in his community. Law
enforcement is not automatic. It isn’t blind. One of the greatest difficulties of the position of
prosecutor is that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the
cases in which he receives complaints.”).
40. Misner, supra note 33, at 718–19 (“Because courts cannot mold an effective system
of law enforcement, and because legislatures are unsuited to the daily implementation of broad
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Furthermore, courts have historically been unsuccessful in their attempts to
impose any sort of judicial review on prosecutors and have therefore been
increasingly more deferential to prosecutors’ discretion.41
The law provides some, albeit minimal, protections for criminal
defendants from prosecutors who may be influenced by personal biases and
consequently exercise discretion improperly. In interpreting the Due Process
Clause, the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor’s discretion and
decision to charge a defendant may not be “deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.”42 The ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
Function—although not legally binding—also provides that “prosecutor[s]
should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or socioeconomic status.”43 Furthermore, in interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the Court has held that a
person’s constitutional rights are violated when a public official representing
the state acts in such a way that practically denies a person the equal
protection of the law.44
Still, while the law protects criminal defendants from prosecutors who act
under unjustifiable biases, the law does not protect the community from
prosecutors who express such biases through speech rather than through
conduct in a particular case. Thus, the question remains as to whether a
prosecutor who holds and expresses bias or animosity through speech can be
entrusted with such expansive discretion.45
B. Conflict of Interest as a Restraint on the Scope of Representation
Prosecutors have a duty to be impartial, neutral, and disinterested in their
role as advocates for justice.46 Although this Note addresses the problems
associated with the expression of a prosecutor’s personal views, it would be
unreasonable to require prosecutors to hold no personal views at all. In fact,

policy, the time has come to encourage prosecutors to fashion local policies of law
enforcement to suit the current needs of their communities.”).
41. Id. at 736.
42. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364 (1978)); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
Similarly, courts limit prosecutors’ unconstitutional discretion in the context of jury selection.
See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
43. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.6(a) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015).
44. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“No reason for [the disparate
treatment] is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except
hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of
the law, is not justified. The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the public administration
which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, and a violation of the
fourteenth amendment of the constitution.”).
45. Situations in which prosecutors hold biases but do not express them are beyond the
scope of this Note.
46. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58
B.C. L. REV. 464, 471 (2017).
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prosecutors themselves may not be aware that the implicit or cognitive biases
they have are affecting their work in unconscious ways.47 Realistically,
every prosecutor holds some political preference or personal belief, and it
would not be a ridiculous proposition to state that virtually all “of [a] lawyer’s
political, social, and emotional interests, as well as the full spectrum of the
lawyer’s thoughts, beliefs [and] feelings” may influence a prosecutor’s
decision-making process.48 What would be ridiculous, however, is to say
that all such interests create an unwaivable conflict that would bar the
prosecutor from properly functioning as an officer of the court and a
representative of the criminal justice system.49 In fact, the ABA, as well as
the judiciary, acknowledge that prosecutors should be allowed to have
personal views as long as the prosecutor keeps his or her professional work
completely separated from those views.50
The standard for determining whether a prosecutor can try a case despite
having conflicting interests hinges on whether the conflict adversely affects
the prosecutor’s performance.51 For example, because ASA Kenneth Lewis
47. Id. at 483 (“The professional literature has traditionally assumed that private lawyers’
conflicting interests can influence their exercise of professional judgment in unconscious
ways. This is no less true for prosecutors.”); see also Developments in the Law—Conflicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1296 (1981); Tigran W. Eldred, The
Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 48 (2009).
48. Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 472; see also ROY D. SIMON WITH NICOLE HYLAND,
SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED 418–20 (2017).
49. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 476–77 (“If conflicts of interest are broadly
conceived to include any ‘political, social, and emotional interests’ or ‘thoughts, beliefs,
feelings, and creeds’ that may affect the prosecutor’s decision-making, then a similar
allegation could be made no matter which prosecutor is assigned to a criminal case with
political implications.”).
50. See Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Loyalty to a client
requires subordination of a lawyer’s personal interests when acting in a professional capacity.
But loyalty to a client does not require extinguishment of a lawyer’s deepest
convictions . . . .”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A
lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not
constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or
activities.”); see also NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS §
1-2.1(b) (3d ed. 2009) (“A prosecutor should not express personal animosity toward opposing
counsel, regardless of personal opinion.”). Of course, there is a distinction between a
prosecutor’s conflicts and an ordinary lawyer’s conflicts because a prosecutor’s client is
society rather than an individual. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 465 & nn.5–6.
51. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (“[A] lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”), with id. r. 1.7(b)(1)
(“Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a
lawyer may represent a client if . . . the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client . . . .”). From an
administrative standpoint, courts have the right to determine whether a prosecutor has a
conflict of interest that will adversely affect the prosecutor’s performance. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D
New Trial § 135 (2012) (“A trial court has the power to disqualify a prosecuting attorney from
proceeding with a particular criminal prosecution if it is determined that the prosecuting
attorney suffers from a conflict of interest that might prejudice him or her against the
accused.”); see, e.g., State v. Williams, 217 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1974) (“If there was a
conflict of interest it does not follow it affected the outcome of the trial. . . . [W]e find no
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was not assigned to the Orlando nightclub case, he had no conflict despite
having expressed animus toward the victims of the massacre. However, the
situation may change if ASA Lewis were, in fact, assigned to this case or any
other case that involves gay people, mothers, or other groups of people
against whom he demonstrated a personal bias.52 Nonetheless, while the
current rules concerning a prosecutor’s conflict of interest aid in determining
whether a criminal defendant’s rights have been violated during a criminal
trial,53 the rules do not address the main question whether a particular
prosecutor should even be allowed to serve the community despite his or her
personal biases.
A common practice in the legal profession is to have the lawyer or
prosecutor recuse himself or herself from a case when a conflict exists.54
Therefore, if ASA Lewis’s biases are considered conflicts, he would have to
recuse himself from cases dealing with gay people or mothers. However,
although seemingly simple, such a recusal is impractical.
There are two tiers of conflicts: potential conflicts and per se conflicts.55
Potential conflicts are those in which a court evaluates the possibility that
some relationship between the lawyer and another person could affect the
fairness of the present case, whereas per se conflicts have a presumption of
prejudice and require an affirmative waiver to overcome.56 One factor that
courts use to determine the existence of a per se conflict is “whether, and to
what extent, public confidence in the integrity of the law profession might be
compromised or eroded by permitting the case to proceed notwithstanding
the potential for mischief.”57 Whether ASA Lewis must be recused from
cases involving parties who are gay, mothers, or otherwise “distasteful” to
him would then pose a hybrid or intermediate tier of conflict: would the
potential, or likelihood, of a per se conflict entirely bar a prosecutor from
taking cases that involve parties against whom the prosecutor is biased?58
While it would be efficient to consider a publicly known, biased prosecutor
to have a per se conflict of interest in any case that involves parties toward
whom the prosecutor has demonstrated bias, such considerations would also
indication a conflict of interest on the part of the county attorney had any effect on the conduct
or outcome of the trial.”).
52. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 465–66 (“Broadly construed, prosecutors’
conflicts can arise not only out of personal and professional relationships . . . but [also] out of
any personal belief . . . that undermines the prosecutors’ ability to pursue justice in a
disinterested way.”); supra Part I.A.
53. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 135 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule, some resulting
prejudice to the defendant must be demonstrated to warrant a new trial even though such a
conflict of interest exists.” (emphasis added)).
54. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(a)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
55. See State v. Norman, 697 A.2d 511, 520 (N.J. 1997) (“Bellucci thus created a two-tier
system for evaluating conflict-of-interest claims . . . .”).
56. Id.; State v. Shieka, 766 A.2d 1151, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
57. Shieka, 766 A.2d at 1161.
58. Because the biased prosecutor has not been assigned to a case, there is no per se
conflict. However, the evaluation of the potential conflict requires an examination as to
whether a per se conflict would exist in the event that the prosecutor does, in fact, take a case
that involves the very group of people toward whom he or she has animosity.
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greatly limit the scope of cases that any prosecutor can take once he or she
expresses personal bias. The regulations surrounding conflicts of interest
would thus undermine the functionality of the prosecutors’ office because
constant recusals detract from prosecutors’ ability to function effectively.
Narrow rules require prosecutors to recuse themselves only from cases where
a conflict of interest exists.59 Classification of certain forms of speech as
conflicts could ultimately cause such rules to constructively remove a
prosecutor from office when he or she has too many “conflicts” to take on
any cases. Such an application might hinder the efficiency of the prosecutor’s
office and prevent many lawyers from becoming prosecutors. Therefore, an
attempt to extend the existing rules concerning conflicts of interest reveals
the inability of current regulations to handle prosecutors who express biases
that contravene the public’s interest.
III. EXISTING LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH
FOCUS ONLY ON ADVERSE EFFECTS WITHIN THE WORKPLACE
Although standards surrounding prosecutorial discretion and conflicts of
interest do not adequately regulate the expressions of a biased prosecutor,
prosecutorial speech is not untethered. Legal restraints exist in both the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment as it applies to
prosecutors60 as well as in other rules within the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.61 The First Amendment of the Constitution grants
citizens, among many rights, the freedom of speech.62 However, public
employees—especially prosecutors—have fewer protections of speech under
the First Amendment because their speech may directly and adversely affect
their offices’ ability to function effectively.63
Before addressing whether prosecutorial speech that undermines
community trust in the criminal justice system may be limited absent any
apparent, adverse effect on performance, it helps to examine the broader
concerns of the Supreme Court in its interpretation and limitation of free
speech for prosecutors. Part III.A first discusses First Amendment
jurisprudence as it applies to public employees and explains how public
employees have qualified protections under the First Amendment by virtue
of their employment in a public office. This Part focuses its discussion on
three Supreme Court cases that establish and highlight these limitations. Part
III.B then extends the discussion and examines how prosecutors have even
fewer protections of speech under the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct when speech is related to prosecutors’ cases. Finally, Part III.C
discusses how certain states apply these qualified protections to help

59. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.7–1.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (stating that
lawyers need only to refuse or withdraw from the representation of a client when a conflict
exists).
60. See infra Part III.A.
61. See infra Part III.B.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
63. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
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determine whether the office should hire or fire a particular individual who
expressed certain viewpoints.
A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of
First Amendment Rights for Public Employees
In an effort to preserve the freedom of speech for citizens, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the First Amendment to protect even the most
outlandish statements made by citizens as long as the speech does not pose
an imminent lawless action that ought to be prevented.64 Thus, the
Constitution protects individuals’ speech even when the speech is
inflammatory or otherwise provocative of others’ emotions.65 If, however, a
prosecutor expresses hatred toward a particular group of people, as did ASA
Lewis, citizens may justifiably feel unsafe or unprotected in their own
country or state. This threat is amplified by the fact that charging decisions
are solely up to the prosecutors’ discretion and are not subject to judicial
review, thereby eliminating any legal recourse for the public when a
prosecutor decides to prosecute—or dismiss—a certain criminal charge.66
Furthermore, because a prosecutor is an employee of the state or federal
government, his or her expression of bias may broadcast mixed messages to
the public concerning the state or federal government’s views.67 Prosecutors
ought to pursue justice rather than any particular individual’s interests.68
64. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951) (holding that advocating
for communism created a clear and present danger and should thus be prohibited), and
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (prohibiting the distribution of leaflets urging
resistance of the draft because such words presented a clear and present danger during
wartime), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (utilizing the
“imminent lawless action” standard and interpreting the First Amendment so as not to ban any
viewpoint absent an imminent lawless act). The imminent lawless action standard is looser
than the clear and present danger standard.
65. Because the Constitution grants protections for opinions, unless there is a specified
target of an imminent lawless action—which would constitute hate speech—there is no
violation of a constitutional right for someone who feels offended or threatened by that speech.
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that burning a cross
on the lawn of an African American family is a protected form of expression despite its
threatening symbolism of the Ku Klux Klan); Nat’l Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432
U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (holding that using a swastika to demonstrate against the Jewish population
was a protected opinion because it is general speech that can be directed toward anyone).
66. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
67. The Constitution grants states the right to express viewpoints so long as the states do
not impose these viewpoints on citizens. See Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S.
Ct. 2239, 2245–46 (2015). State speech is generally inferred from a certain action of policy
that endorses a particular viewpoint. See, e.g., id. at 2253 (permitting states to choose the
content of their speech by denying the placement of confederate flags on a customized license
plate); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689–90 (2010) (allowing state
universities to deny support for student organizations that do not adopt an antidiscrimination
policy); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (holding that granting of funds to families
not participating in abortion planning is a permitted form of speech by the state). But see
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 821 (1995) (finding that
imposing financial burdens on an “unfavorable” group is discriminatory and therefore a
violation of the First Amendment).
68. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the
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However, when a prosecutor who works for the state holds a different opinion
or viewpoint than that set forth by the state, the state has an interest in limiting
or separating that prosecutor’s speech from its own. Thus, First Amendment
jurisprudence concerning free speech for prosecutors is predominantly
concerned with balancing the public’s interest in having an informed,
unhindered discussion about matters of public concern with the state’s
interest in ensuring that its functionality is not compromised by the
constitutional rights of its employees.69
Due to the potential conflicts that arise between public employees and the
state, the protections under the First Amendment are limited when applied to
state or federal officials. When employed by the government, individuals are
expected to waive certain constitutional rights.70 This expectation stems
from the notion that the government as an employer needs greater control
over its employees to function effectively.71 The contravening concern,
however, is that a public official’s employment may not be conditioned on
an infringement of that individual’s constitutional freedom of expression.72
The Court in Connick v. Myers73 held that “content, form, and context” are
crucial in determining whether particular speech should be protected.74
When Sheila Myers, an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, was
being transferred to another section, she expressed her opposition to the
transfer by discussing her complaints about several office matters, including
the office transfer policy.75 She subsequently circulated a questionnaire to
ask other assistant district attorneys about their opinions concerning these
office matters.76
Justice Byron White emphasized that the Court has an interest in
“ensur[ing] that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government.”77 Nonetheless, this interest does not mean that
government employees have an absolute right of free speech. Rather,
governments have relatively broad authority to manage the speech of their
employees when the content, form, and context of the expression78 “cannot
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community.”79 Absent this authority, employers will be
forced to keep “a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee,” and the
retention of such a prosecutor would “ultimately impair the efficiency of [the]

law[,] . . . [to] serve[] the public interest and . . . increase public safety[,] . . . protect the
innocent and convict the guilty, consider the interests of victims and witnesses, and respect
the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, including suspects and defendants.”).
69. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 573 (1968).
70. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
71. Id.
72. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
73. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
74. Id. at 147–48.
75. Id. at 141.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 147.
78. Id. at 147–48.
79. Id. at 146.
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office.”80 Due to this qualification, the Court held that Myers’s questionnaire
was not protected under the First Amendment because it did not “bring to
light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of
Connick and others.”81 The questionnaire, if released to the public, would
only indicate that an employee is not satisfied with her office’s policies.82
In an effort to consolidate the contrary interests of a public employee and
the government, the Court narrowly classified unprotected speech in Garcetti
v. Ceballos.83 Because public employees are nonetheless citizens, any
restrictions on their constitutional rights as a condition of employment must
be limited to what is necessary for the employer to efficiently and effectively
perform its services.84
After receiving a call from a defense attorney alleging that an affidavit
used to obtain a search warrant was inaccurate, Deputy District Attorney
Richard Ceballos examined the affidavit and realized that it contained serious
misrepresentations.85 In his attempt to remedy the misrepresentations,
Ceballos submitted a memorandum to his supervisor recommending a
dismissal of the case on the ground that the search warrant resulted from
However, Ceballos’s supervisor ignored the
misrepresentations.86
memorandum and continued to prosecute the case.87 At the close of the case,
the supervisor reassigned Ceballos, transferred him to another courthouse,
and denied him a promotion.88 Ceballos asserted that he was retaliated
against for the content of the memorandum, which should have been
protected by the First Amendment.89
The Court was faced with the question of how far the First Amendment
extends beyond the individual speaker to the public at large. Justice Kennedy
reemphasized in Garcetti the extent to which the First Amendment may
protect a public employee: the Court held that a public official’s speech is
protected only when the public official is not acting within his or her official
capacity.90 Contrarily, because Ceballos was speaking pursuant to his duties,
the content of the memorandum was not protected under the First
Amendment.91 Thus, when the motivation and opportunity for speaking on
any given matter are created by the government by virtue of the prosecutor’s
80. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974).
81. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
82. Id.
83. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
84. Id. at 419.
85. Id. at 413–14.
86. Id. at 414.
87. Id. at 414–15.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 415.
90. Id. at 417 (“The Court has made clear that public employees do not surrender all their
First Amendment rights by reason of their employment. Rather, the First Amendment protects
a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of
public concern.”).
91. Id. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
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employment, that speech is subject to the government’s control in all
respects.92 The Court emphasized that the controlling factor in Garcetti was
that Ceballos was acting pursuant to his duties, not that Ceballos made his
speech within the workplace or spoke of a matter pertinent to his
employment.93 However, the Court also noted that no limitation of the First
Amendment may infringe upon the public’s right to an “informed, vibrant
dialogue in a democratic society.”94
In fact, the Court has long emphasized the importance of preserving speech
that contributes to the public forum.95 In Pickering v. Board of Education,96
Marvin L. Pickering, a high school teacher in Illinois, was terminated from
his position for submitting a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school
district’s means of raising revenue.97 Although the school justified its actions
by saying the letter was detrimental to the interests of the education system,98
the Supreme Court held that Pickering’s termination was wrongful and
violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.99
The Court noted that the fundamental goal of democracy is to preserve
“[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of
public importance.”100 As citizens of a democratic society, public employees
must have the right to comment “on matters of public concern.”101 The Court
sidestepped the concern of public employers by stating that, when speech
concerns a matter of public importance, the fact that the declarant is a public
employee is unrelated to the individual’s interest in speaking as a member of
the public.102
Ultimately, these cases demonstrate that prosecutorial speech is not
protected when the speech (1) interferes with the office’s functions, (2) is

92. Id. at 421–22 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer
itself has commissioned or created.”).
93. Id. at 420–21.
94. Id. at 419.
95. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573–74 (1968).
96. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
97. Id. at 564.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 574–75.
100. Id. at 573.
101. Id. at 574; see also Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (1988) (extending
employees’ rights beyond freedom of speech to freedom of association and holding that
transferring an employee for attending an abortion rights panel during her vacation was a
violation of the employee’s First Amendment rights because abortion is a matter “of great
public concern”). Although this is an absolute right granted by the First Amendment, the
Court laid out some qualifying factors. Because the public interest lies in having an
unhindered debate, the Court excludes statements that would not add to the public debate,
including statements made by a declarant who either knows of or recklessly disregards the
falsity of the statement. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
102. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (“However, in a case such as the present one, in which the
fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of
the public communication made by a teacher, we conclude that it is necessary to regard the
teacher as the member of the general public he seeks to be.”).
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made pursuant to the prosecutor’s duties, or (3) does not address a matter of
public concern.
B. Prohibited Use of Private Speech for Prosecutors
Prosecutorial speech is also regulated, to some extent, by the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.8(f) of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct requires prosecutors to
refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise
reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel,
employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a
criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor
would [otherwise] be prohibited from making.103

Thus, a prosecutor may not use extrajudicial statements to benefit the
prosecution’s case against a criminal defendant.104 Under this rule, a
prosecutor who makes a statement that is otherwise protected under the First
Amendment, such as commenting on a matter of public concern,105 may be
prohibited from exercising that right because it violates the defendant’s due
process right under the Constitution106 and interferes, either positively or
negatively, with the office’s mission to pursue justice fairly.107
While a narrow reading of Rule 3.8 yields a simple regulation stating that
prosecutors may not use extrajudicial statements to gain an advantage over a
criminal defendant beyond what the evidence admitted at trial allows, a
broader reading interprets Rule 3.8 as a limitation of prosecutorial conduct.
Under that broader reading, prosecutors cannot use their speech to reach
beyond their professional capacity and thereby further their case. Thus, the
underlying principle may be that prosecutors cannot use their private,
extrajudicial statements to promulgate their own views or personal opinions
in any professional matter, even if it is not necessarily linked to unfairly, or
illegally, disadvantaging a defendant in a particular case.108 Whereas the
narrower reading is concerned with a criminal defendant’s constitutional
right,109 the broader reading is concerned with a prosecutor’s professional
responsibility.110 Under the broader reading, ASA Lewis’s extrajudicial
statements expressing his animus toward gay people and mothers is a form
103. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
104. For a detailed discussion of contemporary limitations of prosecutorial speech within
the scope of their employment as outlined by the ABA, see generally Emily A. Vance, Note,
Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, or Tweet?: The Need for New Restraints in Light of Social
Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 367 (2015).
105. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
106. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
107. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
108. See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 471 (discussing personal interests as a
conflict of interest prosecutors may have, which would undermine their necessary
disinterestedness in their role).
109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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of speech that can unfairly sway, either positively or negatively, the public’s
attitude toward either the victim or perpetrator of certain crimes and could
therefore be prohibited.
C. Hiring and Firing of a Prosecutor
Based on the Individual’s Viewpoints
State Attorney Jeff Ashton believed that he was not able to fire ASA
Kenneth Lewis for Lewis’s initial posts about mothers due to the First
Amendment.111 Instead, Ashton implemented a social media policy in the
office and later used that policy as ground for ASA Lewis’s termination.112
However, it is unclear whether Ashton needed to implement a social media
policy in order to fire ASA Lewis. Kenneth Lewis was a prosecutor, and
prosecutors are expected to possess a certain requisite character that ensures
the ability to pursue justice.113 Ashton could have fired ASA Lewis for not
possessing the requisite character demanded of a prosecutor. In fact, the
Illinois State Bar has even considered an applicant’s expressions of his
personal views in denying him admission.114 Thus, it follows logically that
prosecutors, who are held to a higher standard of professional responsibility
than ordinary lawyers,115 should be terminated for failing to meet such
standards. Part III.C.1 examines the aforementioned case to demonstrate
how the Illinois State Bar Committee found an applicant to be unfit for the
practice of law based on the applicant’s expressions of his personal views.
Part III.C.2 then explains how prosecutors may be terminated for their
personal expressions due to the unique nature of a prosecutor’s role in
society.
1. Looking to an Individual’s Expressed Bias in Determining
Character and Fitness for Admission to the Bar
Matthew Hale sought to be admitted to the Illinois State Bar but was denied
admission.116 Although he had passed the written examination, the Bar
Committee found Hale to be “unfit to practice law” due to his history of being
“a public advocate of white supremacy and the leader of an organization . . .
dedicated to racism and anti-Semitism.”117 Hale had expressed that his
111. Bleier, supra note 4 (“I am not going to punish someone for what is clearly political
speech . . . .”).
112. Knowles, supra note 4 (“As a result, he was forced to attend sensitivity training and
his office created a social media policy, one that he has now violated.”); cf. BARBARA S.
MAGILL & WORKLAW NETWORK, WORKPLACE PRIVACY: REAL ANSWERS AND PRACTICAL
SOLUTIONS 124 (Burton J. Fishman ed., 2d ed. 2007) (“The First Amendment’s prohibition
against governmental restriction of free speech does not prevent private employers from taking
disciplinary action against employees based on the content of their [social media postings].”).
113. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015); Jackson, supra note 16.
114. See, e.g., Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678, 679 (7th Cir. 2003).
115. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
116. Hale, 335 F.3d at 679.
117. Id. The Committee also considered Hale’s prior arrests in its evaluation of his
character and fitness. Id. at 680–81.
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“mission in life is to bring about the hegemony of the white race, the legal
abolition of equal protection, and the deportation of non-white
Americans.”118 In response, the Committee determined that Hale’s mission
demonstrated that he had a propensity to act in ways “that were inconsistent
with membership in the bar,” whose lawyers “have a special responsibility to
uphold the rule of law for all persons.”119 The Committee found that Hale’s
“distasteful views” were not protected under the First Amendment for the
purposes of admission to the bar and further characterized Hale as a bigot
with a “gross deficiency in moral character” under “any civilized standards
of decency.”120 Despite testimony from multiple witnesses asserting that
Hale was fit to practice law as well as Hale’s assertion that he would comply
with the bar’s standards during the hours he worked as an attorney, Hale was
denied admission.121
The First Amendment clearly protects political speech,122 but Hale was
denied admission to the bar for his dedication to racism and anti-Semitism.123
On its face, it seems that Illinois’s refusal to admit Hale to the bar was due to
his political views of white supremacy and anti-Semitism. The Illinois Bar
Committee justified its decision “by drawing a distinction between Hale’s
First Amendment right to express ideas and his right to become a member of
the Illinois bar.”124 While Hale may be free to express such views under the
First Amendment, his freedom to do so as a citizen does not require a finding
that he “possesses the requisite character and fitness . . . for the practice of
law.”125 At which point, however, does an examination of a candidate’s
personal views constitute discrimination based on an individual’s political
views?126
It seems as if the Committee in Hale, by characterizing Hale as grossly
immoral and indecent, denied Hale admission because his discriminatory
views were not simply political preferences but rather evinced animosity
toward certain groups of people. However, the exact standard as to “how to
categorize and assess animus has become a recurring and unresolved question
in equal protection law.”127 In the situation with ASA Lewis, State Attorney
118. Id.
119. Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id. Although Hale had filed petitions all the way to the Supreme Court, the
Committee’s decision was not overturned. Malika Simmons, Case Note, Hale v. Comm. on
Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2003), 10 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J.
199, 200 (2004).
122. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143,
144 (2010).
123. Hale, 335 F.3d at 679.
124. Id. at 680.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 681 (“Hale’s complaint squarely raised the claim that the Committee had
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments when it arbitrarily denied his bar application,
because it based its decision not on any conduct in which Hale may have engaged, but instead
solely on its speculation about his likely future conduct and its distaste for his political and
religious beliefs.” (emphasis added)).
127. Nan D. Hunter, Animus Thick and Thin: The Broader Impact of the Ninth Circuit
Decision in Perry v. Brown, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111, 112 (2012).
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Ashton believed the line between political speech and animus is identified
based on a person’s actions.128 Justice Scalia described animosity as
“hat[red] [toward] any human being or class of human beings” but
distinguished it from “moral disapproval” of such people or their conduct.129
Still, the First Amendment protects “the speech rights of anarchists,
syndicalists, communists, civil rights marchers, Maoist flag burners, and
other marginal, dissident, or unorthodox speakers” in the interest of political
liberty of the people from the government.130 This protection is the result of
the Court’s broad construction of the definition of “political.” Generally,
political speech concerns “all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period.”131
2. Terminating Prosecutors as Policymakers
Under Stricter Standards of Loyalty
What remains consistent in each discussion of the qualifications and
exceptions to the protections of the First Amendment is the notion of
“adverse effect” to the government employer or public institution. Connick
held that the questionnaire was not protected because it was adverse to the
office’s functions and did not meaningfully contribute to the public
discussion.132 Garcetti emphasized that the government may regulate speech
made pursuant to an employee’s duties because such speech affects the
office’s functions.133 Pickering held the teacher’s speech to be protected
because it addressed an unfavorable process in the schools and served to
improve the education system.134 The Committee in Hale was concerned
about Hale’s future propensity for discrimination as a member of the bar and
found that propensity to be adverse to the interests of the bar.135 It follows
that, when a certain character is required of individuals who seek to become
prosecutors, a demonstrated lack of such character by a prosecutor should be
ground for termination when there is an apparent adverse effect on the
office’s functions by such viewpoints.

128. Bleier, supra note 4 (“‘I’ve never had a victim come to us and say this man is not
treating us with respect . . . I am not going to punish someone for what is clearly political
speech.’” (alteration in original)); Weiner, supra note 4.
129. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Sullivan, supra note 122, at 144. Still, the Court has limited the scope of political
speech to exclude fighting words. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) (holding that speech may be banned when the words, “by their very utterance[,] inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”). For a further discussion of the
limitations on free speech, see generally Chip Hutzler, A Paradoxical Approach to the First
Amendment and Hate-Speech, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 205 (1993).
131. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See generally W. Robert Gray, Public
and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic Convergence in Free-Speech Values, 1
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1 (1994).
132. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
133. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006).
134. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
135. Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2003).
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State Attorney Ashton’s determination that ASA Lewis’s speech was
political because it did not adversely affect his treatment of victims is
intelligible.136 What Ashton failed to emphasize immediately,137 though, is
that Lewis’s speech constitutes animus rather than political speech,138 and
such speech may have an adverse effect on the public perception and trust in
the effective functioning of the prosecutor’s office.139 However, it is unclear
whether the First Amendment already precluded such speech from the scope
of its protections and thereby gave Ashton sufficient ground to terminate
Lewis.
Some jurisdictions adopt a bright-line rule that holds prosecutors to a
stricter standard of loyalty to their employers.140 Under this bright-line rule,
employers may terminate prosecutors at any time for any political
differences—whether expressed or merely held—that may undermine an
employer’s confidence in a prosecutor’s loyalty to the office.141 The
Supreme Court has also noted that, to terminate a public employee for his or
her political views, the employer must “demonstrate that party affiliation is
an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved.”142
In Marsilio v. Vigluicci,143 Tommie Jo Marsilio, a county prosecutor, ran
for election as a county judge. In preparation for her campaign, she circulated
a proposed campaign advertisement within her committee that accused her
opponent of being corrupt.144 Victor Vigluicci, her employer, told Marsilio
that she would have to either cease the circulation of the advertisement and
apologize to her political opponent or be terminated from her position as an
assistant county prosecutor.145 When Marsilio did not comply, Vigluicci
terminated her, and Marsilio subsequently filed a suit alleging wrongful
termination on the ground of protected political speech.146
136. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
137. Fieldstadt, supra note 9 (describing how State Attorney Ashton realized the extremity
of Lewis’s speech but still “fought calls to fire Lewis” and implemented a social media policy
instead).
138. Kenneth Lewis’s posts demonstrated hatred toward gay people and mothers rather
than mere moral disapproval of their actions, and his posts did not convey any information
that would be useful for public debate. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
139. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 (“When [public employees] speak out, they can express
views that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of
governmental functions.”).
140. See, e.g., infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
141. Simasko v. County of St. Clair, 417 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mere fact
that an employee is affiliated with an opposing political party, however quietly, can cause the
employer not to trust the employee to implement fully the employer’s practices.”); see also
Dimmig v. Wahl, 983 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a deputy sheriff’s political
inactivity could hinder his effective performance, thereby permitting his employer to terminate
him).
142. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
143. 924 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ohio 2013).
144. Id. at 844 (“The advertisement stated, ‘The “Good Old Boys” Say elect Kevin
Poland . . . Real People Say Elect Tommie Jo Marsilio . . . She is not a member of the Ravenna
“Good Old Boys” corruption club.’” (alterations in original)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 845.
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The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that Marsilio’s
position as an assistant county prosecutor denied her any First Amendment
protections for speech related to her political views147 because her position
was one of policymaking.148 This holding is consistent with First
Amendment jurisprudence because, although the parties agreed that
Marsilio’s speech may be protected by the First Amendment for addressing
a matter of public concern,149 the court found that Marsilio’s “free speech
interests [did not] outweigh the efficiency interests of her government
employer.”150 In rendering its decision, the court referenced a line of cases
in which the Supreme Court emphasized that “a public employer may
terminate a public employee in a policymaking or confidential position . . .
because of [the employee’s] political affiliation without violating the First
Amendment” when such affiliations would hinder the effectiveness and
efficiency of the office.151 Furthermore, the court held that, because
147. Branti, 445 U.S. at 515 (noting that the First Amendment typically protects citizens
from being terminated for personal speech and, therefore, beliefs).
148. Id. at 852. The Sixth Circuit articulated four categories of public employees who are
to be considered policymaking or confidential employees:
(1) positions specifically named in relevant law to which discretionary authority in
carrying out law enforcement or political policy is granted; (2) positions to which a
significant amount of category-one authority has been delegated, or positions not
specifically named by law but inherently possessing category-one type authority; (3)
confidential advisors to category-one position-holders; or (4) positions that are part
of a group of positions filled by balancing out political party representation or by
balancing out selections made by different government bodies.
Id. at 850–51 (citing Silberstein v. Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 319 (6th Cir. 2006)); see id.
(describing the Sixth Circuit holding that prosecutors fall within this policymaking or
confidential-employee exception, therefore allowing the government to terminate prosecutors
for political speech without violating the First Amendment); see also Latham v. Office of
Attorney Gen., 395 F.3d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]here the inherent duties of the
employee are broad and limited primarily by the discretion of the policymaker, it is likely that
the employee is herself a confidential or policymaking employee under Elrod.”); Monks v.
Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Because Michigan law statutorily imposes the
inherent policy-making responsibilities of the prosecutor on the assistant prosecutor, we hold
that the job of assistant prosecutor is a policy-making position.”).
149. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 849; see supra Part III.B.
150. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
151. Id. (citing Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (“Thus, if an employee’s private political beliefs would
interfere with the discharge of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may be required
to yield to the State’s vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency.”
(citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 366 (1976))). Circuit courts apply this doctrine in various
ways. Many circuits treat the Pickering balancing test as separate from identifying whether a
public employee has a policymaking position under Elrod and Branti, whereas the Ninth
Circuit holds that a finding that a public employee has a policymaking position automatically
precludes any Pickering analysis. Compare Rose, 291 F.3d at 922 (“We adopt an approach
similar to that of the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, and hold that where an employee is in
a policymaking or confidential position and is terminated for speech related to his political or
policy views, the Pickering balance favors the government as a matter of law.”), and Lewis v.
Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] policymaking employee may be discharged
on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular
political party . . . [when] the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.”),
with Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n employee’s
status as a policymaking or confidential employee would be dispositive of any First
Amendment retaliation claim.”), and Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328,
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prosecutors need to show loyalty to their employer,152 their political views
and expressions constitute speech within the scope of their employment.153
Ultimately, the court held that Marsilio’s political speech was sufficient to
undermine the employer’s trust in Marsilio’s performance154 and was
therefore a valid ground for termination.155 This very loose standard allows
an employer to terminate prosecutors whom the employer believes might be
disloyal due to their political views or affiliations.156
Despite this authority granted to employers who perceive disloyalty, the
question of a prosecutor’s speech affecting the community’s trust in the office
remains unanswered. Marsilio, by addressing the issue of loyalty, is
concerned with working relationships within the office between the employer
and employee rather than the public’s perception of the employee.157
Similarly, in ASA Lewis’s situation, State Attorney Ashton expressly stated
that he felt ASA Lewis was performing perfectly well despite his “offensive
and dehumanizing” speech and therefore did not initially terminate Lewis for
his speech.158 Yet, the law does nothing to punish a prosecutor whose
animosity does not create a concern of loyalty to the chief prosecutor, even
where such speech might nonetheless destroy the community’s trust in the
prosecutor and the office.

1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because we hold that [plaintiff’s] position . . . was a policymaking one,
we do not address [plaintiff’s] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free
speech outweighs the [employer’s] interest in running an efficient office.”).
152. This duty of loyalty stems from the notion that assistant prosecuting attorneys are
statutory agents of the elected prosecutor who are authorized to act on behalf of the elected
prosecutor. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 851–52.
153. Id. at 853–54.
154. Simasko v. County of St. Clair, 417 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mere fact
that an employee is affiliated with an opposing political party, however quietly, can cause the
employer not to trust the employee to implement fully the employer’s practices.”); Latham v.
Office of Attorney Gen., 395 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that, when a confidential
or policymaking employee’s speech might cause the employer to be unable to trust the
employee to implement the employer’s policies fully, his “conduct in speaking out against the
central enforcement policies of [the] department . . . [is] sufficiently insubordinate to
overcome any First Amendment bar to [his] termination”).
155. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 853–54; see also Rose, 291 F.3d at 923 (“In other words,
the government’s interest in appointing politically loyal employees to certain positions
converges with its interest in operating an efficient workplace when dealing with
policymaking employees because loyalty by those employees is an essential requirement for
the efficient functioning of the workplace.”).
156. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (“The determination for the Court, therefore, is . . .
whether [the employee’s] speech could lead the employer not to trust the employee to loyally
implement the employer’s practices.” (first emphasis added)).
157. See id. at 852.
158. Bleier, supra note 4 (“Despite calling his subordinate’s remarks ‘offensive and
dehumanizing,’ State Attorney Jeff Ashton said Lewis will not be reprimanded.”).
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IV. THE NEED FOR LIMITED FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
OF PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH THAT HAS
NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
Prosecutors are citizens and deserve some First Amendment
protections.159 The law is clear that the First Amendment does not protect a
prosecutor’s speech that directly interferes with the office’s functions.160
Some circuits even allow prosecutors to be terminated for political speech if
the chief prosecutor believes the subordinate may be disloyal.161 However,
it is evident that this method of holding prosecutors accountable for their
speech is insufficient and inadequate to protect the People’s interest in being
adequately represented by prosecutors in criminal proceedings.162
A prosecutor’s duty is to serve the public163 and to uphold the public
interest.164 Although the chief prosecutor has the authority to determine what
the public interest is,165 the chief prosecutor, like every other prosecutor in
the office, is also obligated to serve the public.166 Therefore, in a broader
sense, the employer of any given prosecutor is the community that the
prosecutor serves.167 Under this view, a prosecutor should be terminated not
only when he or she undermines the office’s functions or the chief
prosecutor’s trust but also when the prosecutor undermines the community’s
trust. Part IV.A consolidates the principles surrounding prosecutorial speech
and proposes that the public may be considered an employer of all
prosecutors and should therefore also have a means of terminating a
prosecutor who undermines the community’s trust. Part IV.B then discusses
some outstanding considerations of the proposed standard and concludes
with an illustration of how the new standard fits within the story of ASA
Lewis’s termination.
A. Community Trust as Another Standard
for Permissible Prosecutorial Speech
Even if the chief prosecutor does not terminate a prosecutor for
problematic speech, the People should be able to terminate the prosecutor as
his or her employer when it has reason to believe that the prosecutor cannot

159. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
160. See supra Part III.A.
161. See supra notes 140–56 and accompanying text.
162. See Fieldstadt, supra note 9 (“Ashton pointed out that he fought calls to fire Lewis in
2014 . . . .”).
163. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015).
164. Id. § 3-1.2(b).
165. Id. § 3-1.3 (“The public’s interests and views . . . should be determined by the chief
prosecutor and designated assistants in the jurisdiction.”).
166. Id. §§ 3-1.1(a), 3-1.2(b). The standards note that the role of any prosecutor,
“regardless of . . . title,” id. § 3-1.1(a), is to “serve[] the public interest,” id. § 3-1.2(b).
167. Cf. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“[T]he State has interests as
an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses . . . .” (emphases added)).
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effectively serve his or her function of pursuing the community’s interest.168
In determining the extent of the First Amendment’s protections for
prosecutorial speech that undermines community trust, it is important to note
that an overly strict approach, such as the bright-line rule that some
jurisdictions have adopted,169 entails a risk of hindering the public’s already
minimal insight into prosecutorial discretion.170 Drastically limiting
protections for problematic prosecutorial speech could deter prosecutors
from communicating with the public in fear of expressing their biases and
thereby further shroud the considerations prosecutors make in exercising
discretion. What follows is that the lack of First Amendment protections
could function as yet another veil that blinds the public from the internal
process of prosecutorial discretion.171 Excessively limiting the protections
for prosecutors could also deter even passionate and motivated attorneys
from becoming prosecutors. Therefore, giving the public too much
transparency into prosecutors’ work could hinder the efficiency of the
prosecutorial office as such transparency may lead to frequent public outcries
for the removal of every prosecutor who expresses any unpopular
opinions.172
Furthermore, although some circuits adopt a bright-line rule allowing the
chief prosecutor to fire a prosecutor for holding or expressing different
political views,173 it would be impractical to give the People the same level
of authority over firing prosecutors. Nonetheless, these circuits are correct
to have strict limitations on prosecutorial speech because prosecutors are the
only representatives of the People who, in turn, should be able to trust their
prosecutors to represent the interests of the community.

168. The ABA also recognizes a need for the regulation of prosecutorial conduct and notes
that reports of prosecutorial misconduct that occur should be addressed. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(j). But see H. Mitchell Caldwell, The
Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV.
51, 55 (2013) (noting that disciplinary actions are grossly inadequate for prosecutors despite
the need for more severe accountability of prosecutors); Angela J. Davis, The Legal
Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 277
(2007) (noting that disciplinary processes have not actually disciplined prosecutors abusing
their power and discretion); David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability
After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot
Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 203–04 (2011)
(explaining how current professional responsibility measures do not adequately police
prosecutorial misconduct). The ABA standard as well as these articles that discuss
prosecutorial misconduct are concerned with prosecutorial misconduct that directly violates
rules of professional conduct. This Note, however, proposes to expand the scope of such
regulation to focus not only on prosecutorial misconduct as defined by the ABA but also on
prosecutorial speech that undermines the community’s trust in and the integrity of the criminal
justice system as a whole.
169. See supra notes 140–56 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 37.
171. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 467 (“[P]rosecutors should be more deliberate
and transparent in how they execute decisions.”).
172. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(j) (recognizing that frivolous complaints
of prosecutorial misconduct exist but can be dismissed).
173. See supra note 151.
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As a result, although it is helpful to adopt the bright-line approach to allow
an employer to terminate a prosecutor for a lack of loyalty, the employer’s
authority should be more constrained to avoid violating prosecutors’
constitutional rights while also ensuring that the prosecutors’ offices have
enough flexibility to function effectively. Rather than allowing the People to
terminate a prosecutor for any possible breach of loyalty, the People should
be able to terminate a prosecutor only when there is a significant pushback
on a prosecutor’s reliability in representing the People’s interests.174 The
foregoing discussion of the First Amendment’s protection of speech
repeatedly mentions the notion of “adverse effects.”175 Thus, it is reasonable
to require some form of adverse effect on the community’s trust in the
criminal justice system as a baseline standard in evaluating prosecutorial
speech. If the community’s trust in the criminal justice system is
substantially and negatively affected by the prosecutor’s speech, that form of
speech should be considered a valid ground for termination.
Because this Note proposes that prosecutors should be terminated for
expressing animosity even before the prosecutor acts according to any such
bias, requiring proof of adverse effect on performance would be difficult.176
This Note’s proposal requires only an adverse effect on the community’s
trust. In determining the standard of proof the public must satisfy to
terminate a prosecutor, the court’s analysis in Hale is instructive.177 If the
public can demonstrate to the disciplinary committee that a prosecutor’s
speech evidences a “gross deficiency in moral character” under “any civilized
standards of decency,”178 the disciplinary committee should reevaluate
whether the prosecutor “possesse[s] the requisite character and fitness” to
serve as a prosecutor.179 This Note proposes a relatively high standard of
“gross deficiency” because prosecutors must have some standard that bars
nonmeritorious or frivolous complaints from being brought by the People to
ensure that the functionality and efficiency of the prosecutorial office is not
unnecessarily compromised.180

174. Just as ASA Lewis was fired for his comments on a case to which he was not assigned,
the People should be able to file complaints about a prosecutor’s general lack of reliability as
a representative of the People in a criminal trial. This Note does not address claims of
prosecutorial misconduct in specific cases but is concerned about a prosecutor’s character and
fitness in serving the People’s interest.
175. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. Although adverse effects on
performance may provide corroborating evidence that the public has reason to distrust a
prosecutor for his or her bias, such evidence would be more aligned with civil claims of
prosecutorial misconduct rather than the issue of trust with which this Note is concerned.
177. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
178. Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2003).
179. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 16 (“[Prosecutors] are thus required to win an
expression of confidence in [their] character by both the legislative and the executive branches
of the government before assuming the responsibilities of a . . . prosecutor.”).
180. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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B. Considerations and Illustration of the Proposed Standard
The implementation of this standard may, admittedly, be difficult for a few
reasons. First, different people hold different views and may lose trust in a
prosecutor for different reasons. Second, neither the victim nor any other
member of the general public is directly represented by prosecutors in the
criminal justice system,181 but it will still be difficult to completely disregard
the emotions of the individuals who allege misconduct or improper biases,
especially if those allegations arise in response to a prosecutor’s conduct or
speech in investigating or trying a case. Nonetheless, in an effort to pursue
justice, prosecutors are expected to “consider the interests of victims and
witnesses[] and respect the constitutional and legal rights of all persons,
including suspects and defendants.”182 Following this expectation, allowing
any informed member of the public—such as potential victims, witnesses,
suspects, or defendants—to file complaints about a prosecutor’s bias would
enable the People to remove the prosecutor from office and thereby prevent
a prosecutor whose biases contravene the community’s interest from
representing the People in a criminal case.
Because this proposed standard involves a breach of the community’s trust,
unpublicized prosecutorial speech cannot be ground for termination.
Whereas a chief prosecutor may terminate a subordinate prosecutor even for
unpublicized speech when the speech undermines either the office’s
functions183 or the employer’s confidence in the prosecutor’s loyalty,184 it is
impossible for the People to complain about speech that was never
publicized. If the People are not aware of the speech and the chief prosecutor
does not feel a need to terminate the subordinate prosecutor for a lack of
loyalty,185 there is no reason for the prosecutor to be terminated because the

181. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2015) (“The prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular . . . witness or
victim.”). Because victims have no right in the criminal justice process, the criminal justice
system is not concerned with whether the victims get justice but rather whether the integrity
of the system is sufficiently preserved to grant justice to society at large. See Mikhail v. Kahn,
991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“[E]ven when individuals are wronged in a manner
cognizable under criminal law, they ‘do not have a constitutional right to the prosecution of
alleged criminals.’” (quoting Capogrosso v. Supreme Court, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009)
(per curiam))).
182. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b).
183. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151 (1983); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168
(1974).
184. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
185. Latham v. Office of Attorney Gen., 395 F.3d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Furthermore,
in Rose, we focused on how the speech would affect the employer’s ability to maintain a
working relationship with his or her employees, rather than whether the speech was ‘public’
or ‘intra-office.’” (emphasis added)); Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 923 (6th Cir. 2002)
(“When such an employee speaks in a manner that undermines the trust and confidence that
are central to his position, the balance definitively tips in the government’s favor because an
overt act of disloyalty necessarily causes significant disruption in the working relationship
between a confidential employee and his superiors.” (emphasis added)).
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prosecutor did nothing to adversely impact the community’s trust in the office
and its functions.186
This proposed standard strives to maximize the protection of a prosecutor’s
First Amendment rights insofar as the public’s interest in regulating its
prosecutors is satisfied. Illustrating the application of this standard with ASA
Lewis’s situation demonstrates how and why Lewis should justifiably be
terminated for his speech. Lewis claims that his derogatory comment
towards mothers was “only meant for his inner circle of friends” despite his
posting the statement on Facebook.187 Under the proposed standard, the
public would be able to remove Lewis from office for holding and expressing
such views publicly. Besides, a prosecutor who expects a public Facebook
post to be contained within his private sphere arguably meets a reasonable
standard of untrustworthiness, and private speech that becomes publicized
through such carelessness justifiably warrants a complaint from the public
that questions the trustworthiness of the prosecutor. Furthermore, even if the
chief prosecutor believes the biased prosecutor could exercise his duties in a
professional manner,188 this proposed standard affords the public an
opportunity to remove a prosecutor who publicly expresses blatant animosity
toward the community he has sworn to serve.
CONCLUSION
Despite the ethical rules governing prosecutorial conduct and the
constitutional authority granted to chief prosecutors in terminating
subordinate prosecutors for problematic speech under the First Amendment,
current measures of regulating problematic prosecutorial speech are still,
evidently, ineffective. To maintain the community’s trust that the interests
of the People will be adequately represented in the criminal justice system,
prosecutors should be held accountable for speech that undermines such trust.
Giving some power to the People—who are the employers of every
prosecutor in the community under a broader, and arguably more technical,
view—in terminating prosecutors who express problematic speech helps
mitigate the extent to which community trust is undermined by prosecutors
who do not demonstrate the requisite character to represent the interests of
the People zealously. Setting community trust as the core standard in
evaluating prosecutorial speech as it pertains to the community’s trust in the
criminal justice system allows prosecutors to enjoy the greatest extent of the
constitutional protections afforded to them under the First Amendment while
also subjecting them to the practical expectations of professional
responsibility expected of the People’s attorney—the prosecutor.

186. The intention of this Note’s proposed standard is not to replace the current method of
employers holding prosecutors accountable for their speech but rather to add another method
by which the People can hold prosecutors accountable for their speech.
187. Paschall-Brown, supra note 3.
188. Bleier, supra note 4 (“‘I’ve never had a victim come to us and say this man is not
treating us with respect . . . . ,’ Ashton said.”).

